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ABSTRACT 
This research applies social identity and intergroup relations theory to the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism and develops a framework that can be used to better understand the 
threat of suicide terrorism and the implications for United States homeland security. 
Suicide terrorism is growing worldwide and is becoming more geographically diverse. 
Traditional studies of suicide terrorism tend to seek causal explanations of the 
phenomenon. This research uses a grounded theory approach to study the phenomenon 
that seeks to offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful framework 
for understanding. 
The findings of this research recommend an alternate framework for 
understanding suicide terrorism based on the application of social identity theory and 
intergroup relations theory. Through the identification of alternative normative accounts 
in the choices that individuals make, this research is able to identify the complex social 
conditions of suicide terrorism and argues that the phenomenon is driven by powerful 
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If we cannot understand why normal people turn to violence, we cannot 
hope to stop that violence, to reduce it, or to immunize against it. If we 
cannot understand radicalization, we will have to live with its effects 
including the extremes of terrorism.1   
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Thesis Statement 
This research applies social identity and intergroup relations theory to the 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism and develops a framework that can be 
used to better understand the threat of suicide terrorism and the 
implications for United States homeland security. 
There has never been a suicide bombing campaign on American soil.2 In 2005, 
just a few years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bruce Hoffman argued 
that the United States would see more suicide attacks in the future. Hoffman wrote that 
suicide bombings are the ultimate “smart bomb,” and that the suicide aspect was essential 
to the success and stunning impact of the 9/11 attacks.3 Was Hoffman incorrect in his 
assessment? It could be argued that enhanced homeland security measures put in place 
since September 11 have precluded transnational suicide terrorists activities from 
occurring, but what about homegrown violent extremists within the United States. 
Several years before September 2001, Oklahoma City bomber and United States citizen 
Timothy McVeigh contemplated turning the bombing into a “suicide mission” but 
decided against the tactic.4 Why haven’t homegrown violent extremists used suicide 
terrorism as a course of action?  
                                                 
1  C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to them and Us, ed. , trans. 
Oxford University Press, 2011)., kindle location 151. 
2  For the purposes of this research, the term “campaign” will refer to an organized course of action to 
achieve a particular goal. 
3  B. Hoffman, “Defending America Against Suicide Terrorism,” Three Years After, Next Steps in 
theWar on Terror (2005), 21–22. 
4  Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City 
Bombing, 1st ed. (New York: Regan Books, 2001), 16. 332. 
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Thirty-two people have been killed in terrorist attacks in the United States since 
the September 11, 2001 attacks at the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The most lethal 
attack, Nidal Hassan’s killing of 13 people at Ft. Hood, occurred as recently as 2009.5 
Furthermore, a study of Islamic radicalization found that between 1989 and 2011, 211 
individuals have radicalized in North America to the point of supporting violence. Many 
of these individuals (80 percent) began their radicalization after the events of September 
11.6 
Law enforcement is currently challenged by the efforts to detect homegrown 
terrorism. The autonomous nature of radicalization sometimes causes homegrown 
terrorism to proliferate in isolation from external networks.7 This challenge requires the 
United States to address the realities of the phenomenon of homegrown radicalization, 
the continued threat that transnational terrorism presents, and more specifically, to 
understand the threat posed by the proliferation of suicide terrorism—one of the most 
deadly forms of terrorism.8 This research examines the phenomenon of suicide terrorism 
using Social Identity Theory (SIT) as a framework for analysis and discusses the 
implications of the findings for U.S. homeland security.  
Why would we want to view this phenomenon from a social identity perspective? 
Oftentimes, terrorists are viewed as “psychos” or “mad men,” an analysis that does not 
take into consideration the impact of cultural and personal relationships.9 They appear to 
be insane because no sane person would commit such an act. Terrorists kill and injure for 
reasons that are incomprehensible.10 By analyzing the terrorist mindset within a defective 
                                                 
5  National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Fact Sheet: Violent 
Extremism in the U.S. (College Park, MD: START, (2011)), 1. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7  Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Homegrown Terrorism: 
The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States, First Session, 112th Congress, 2011, 7. 
8  National Counterterrorism Center, 2011 NCTC Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: National 
Counterterrorism Center, (2011), 13. 
9  C. McCauley, “Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism,” in 
Psychology of Terrorism, eds. B. M. Bongar and others (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
13–31, 14–15. 
10  F. M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy, Greenwood Publishing Group, (2006), 1. 
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context, the main approach to understanding terrorists often misinterpret their 
behaviors.11 For example, these analyses often view terrorism as a static phenomenon 
that does not take into consideration factors such as the terrorist group’s cultural 
background and ideology.12 Frameworks, such as Social Identity Theory, provide a broad 
explanation for understanding these groups in general, and their patterns of behavior. It is 
a framework that is useful in understanding how group behavior is affected by intergroup 
relations and conflict.  
Social Identity Theory explains that, by belonging to a group, individuals can 
attain strong feelings of self worth. Accompanying these feelings are emotions, such as 
pride of your group.13 These feelings of self worth and pride can be achieved through an 
individual’s perception that his group is attempting to attain a legitimate goal, such as 
enhancing the welfare of the citizens of its country. By understanding the mindset of the 
terrorist, one takes an important step towards stopping terrorism.14 
Existing literature on the subject, however, has attempted to explain the 
proliferation of suicide terrorism by focusing on one dimension of the phenomenon. For 
example, Bruce Hoffman argues that suicide terrorism has traditionally occurred in 
environments that place an emphasis on communal bonds and have a history of self-
sacrifice.15 Self-sacrifice, however, is found commonly in history and found often 
occurring in cultures that have not had a single instance of suicide terrorism.16 Suicide 
bombing campaigns have occurred in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, 
Lebanon, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka. Each country has a distinct culture and history. A 
one-dimensional analysis is insufficient in finding common enabling conditions that 
allows suicide terrorism to occur and flourish. There are no simple causal explanations 
                                                 
11 Anders Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism.” Unpublished Research, 1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 (2004), 243–281, 253.  
16  H. D. Barlow, Dead for Good: Martyrdom and the Rise of the Suicide Bomber, Paradigm Pub, 
(2007). 
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for terrorism because the causal factors tend to be complex.17 A full explanation of 
suicide bombing must take into consideration three interactive components: The 
individuals that execute the missions, the organizations that design the missions, and the 
societies that support the missions.18 It is the interactive nature of these three components 
that must be studied and a framework must be developed that can lead to a better 
understanding of this complex phenomenon. 
With this in mind, it is important to ask the question; what are the social and 
cultural conditions that allow suicide terrorism to occur and can a framework be 
developed through the research of social identity and intergroup relations, which could be 
used by homeland security officials to better understand the proliferation of this growing 
threat and the implications for homeland security?  
B. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
Today’s threat environment, as it relates to suicide terrorism, is constantly 
changing and deadly. In order to understand how this phenomenon can impact security at 
home, it is necessary to analyze global patterns of suicide attacks. In the six-year period 
from 2004 to 2009, there were 1,833 suicide attacks, out of which 92 percent were 
directed against the United States.19 Moreover, suicide terrorism has become more 
common and geographically diverse. In 2011, there were over 10,000 terrorism related 
attacks in seventy countries. These attacks resulted in 12,500 deaths.20 The most lethal 
form of terrorist attack in the world, which accounted for 2,670 deaths, was suicide 
bombings. Suicide attacks accounted for 2.7 percent of all terrorist attacks, but accounted 
for 21 percent of the deaths related to terrorist attacks.21 Furthermore, from 1990 until 
                                                 
17  F. M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View: What they Experience and Why they Come 
to DestroyGreenwood Publishing Group, 2006)., 99–100. Jeffrey W. Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom: A 
History of Suicide Bombing (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 346, 178. 
18  Jeffrey W. Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2012), 346, 178. 
19  Robert Anthony Pape, James K. Feldman, and Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, Cutting 
the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it (Chicago; London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 349, 2. 
20  National Counterterrorism Center, 2011 NCTC Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: National 
Counterterrorism Center, [2011])., 9. 
21 Ibid., 13. 
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1999, there were 106 suicide-bombing attacks in fifteen different countries that claimed 
the lives of over 1,500 people. In comparison, from 2000 until 2010, there were 2,114 
suicide-bombing attacks in thirty-two different countries that killed over 26,000 people.22  
As grave as these statistics are, a campaign of suicide terrorism on American soil 
would have a devastating effect on the citizens of this country. Large numbers of 
fatalities, extensive damage to property, and a severely diminished faith in homeland 
security would be the expected consequences of a suicide terrorism campaign. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by the effects of the suicide attacks of 9/11; the behavior of 
citizens following an event can have a deleterious effect on the economy.23 Suicide 
terrorism is a successful form of coercion that is intended to make governments concede 
to demands.24 Suicide operations are inexpensive to execute,25 convey an image of 
strength, and build solidarity among groups.26 Research is needed to better understand 
this phenomenon in order to determine if it could be carried out in a similar campaign 
manner with the same results in the United States. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What effective framework can be developed through the application of social 
identity and intergroup relation theories to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, which 
could be used by U.S. homeland security officials to better understand the threat of 
suicide terrorism? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
This research is timely, essential, and will lead to an understanding of the social 
and cultural conditions of suicide terrorism. The extant literature on the subject clearly 
identifies the characteristics and logic terrorist groups use when employing suicide 
                                                 
22 “CPOST - Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism”“ 
http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search_results.php (accessed 7/15/2012, 2012). 
23  Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 261., 183. 
24  R. A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 
3 (2003), 343–361., 344. 
25  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and expanded edition ed. (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 432., 132–133. 
26  Hoffman and McCormick, Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack, 243–281, 250.  
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terrorism. One of the main characteristics of the act of suicide terrorism is the 
dependence on the death of the perpetrator in the execution of the mission. Suicide 
terrorism conveys the group’s message in a way that traditional methods of warfare never 
could. It forces the enemy to see the level of commitment demonstrated by the terror 
group members and suggests that if they are willing to blow themselves up in an effort to 
make their political point—then there is little hope of defending against their attacks.  
In addition, existing research has tried to “define” the radicalization process both 
abroad and in the United States in an effort to determine if there is a specific 
indoctrination path that individuals follow in becoming terrorists. While it is interesting 
to see how a person moves from earnest believer in a particular ideology to a position 
where they are willing to act illegally—perhaps even murder—on behalf of that belief, 
the path described is not universal.27 The research shows that there are many radicalizing 
paths, and that they differ based on social grouping, individual history, context and 
setting and religious and cultural background.28 
Research has been done on the psychological factors associated with choosing 
suicide terrorism as a method for conveying the message of the group.29 And while some 
of the research identified here serves as a background and contextual base—no previous 
research answers the specific issues addressed in this effort. It is not clear if the  
environment, social backing, and other essential elements necessary to sustain a suicide 
terrorism campaign are attendant in the United States. This research starts the process of 
uncovering that difficult question. 
Research has found that the combination of indoctrination and the influence of a 
charismatic religious or political leader create a bonded group and establish the proper 
                                                 
27  C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us, ed. trans. 
Oxford University Press, 2011), kindle location 4532. 
28  F. M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View: What they Experience and Why they Come 
to DestroyGreenwood Publishing Group, 2006).; M. D. Silber, A. Bhatt and New York (NY). Police Dept, 
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown ThreatPolice Department, 2007).; Ami Pedahzur, Suicide 
Terrorism (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 261. 
29  Larry H. Pastor, “Countering the Psychological Consequences of Suicide Terrorism,” Psychiatric 
Annals 34, no. 9 (2004), 701–707. 
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conditions for suicide terrorism to flourish.30 This runs counter to what many believe is a 
form of terrorism unique to Islamic extremists. For example, from 1987 to 2009, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an ethnic Tamil terrorist organization that 
conducted over one hundred suicide terrorist attacks, was responsible for the deaths of 
over 1,500 people during their campaign for independence in Sri Lanka.31 The mostly 
Hindu Tamil population comprises approximately 16 percent of Sri Lanka.32 Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran headed the LTTE and was a charismatic leader, who was responsible for the 
sect-like feature of the organization and a principle source of inspiration for the suicide 
terrorists themselves.33  
In addition, Hoffman and McCormick argue that suicide terrorism cannot take 
place without the presence of enabling social norms, such as popular acceptance of 
suicide terrorism and martyrdom by the collective.34 This thesis explores these and other 
enabling social norms and conditions necessary for sustaining suicide campaigns.  
This research provides an application of social identity and intergroup relations 
theory to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Moghaddam writes that the starting 
premise of social identity theory holds that individuals are motivated to achieve a positive 
and distinct identity. Moghaddam argues that rather than being inherited, these needs are 
flexible and can best be understood in the “context of cultural evolution.”35 This thesis 
examines suicide terrorism within the context of these social and cultural conditions and 
uses the basic tenants of social identity theory to draw conclusions.  
This research will fill a gap in the discourse on suicide terrorism. Specifically, this 
thesis analyzed statements from Islamic radical Middle Eastern suicide bombers, who 
                                                 
30  Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, no. 5612 (2003), 1534–1534–9., 1534.  
31  “CPOST - Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism “ 
http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search_results.php (accessed 7/15/2012, 2012). 
32  Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing, 346, 89. 
33  Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 261., 71. 
34  Hoffman and McCormick, Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack, 243–281, 250. 
35  Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 207, 
102. 
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have used suicide terrorism in the past, and identifies if they are motivated for their acts 
by the need to achieve a positive and distinct identity. These results are analyzed and 
used to develop a framework that can be applied to the social and cultural conditions in 
the United States.  
E. PARAMETERS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This central premise of this research examines the question of whether social 
identify and intergroup relations theory can be applied to the phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism in order to gain a better understanding of the act and to develop a framework 
that can be used to compare to the positioning of radicalized Islamic fundamentalist 
individuals in American society. It is a starting point to better understanding if radicalized 
United States citizens could conduct a campaign of suicide terrorism on American soil. It 
is not intended to explain the actions of foreign actors on American soil. The research 
focuses on sociological conditions and factors and does not attempt to examine the 
psychological factors associated with a person’s decision to commit an act of suicide. 
Finally, this thesis did not produce an absolute solution to the proliferation of suicide 
terrorism. This research is intended to direct and stimulate discourse on the social identity 
and positioning of radicalized Islamic fundamentalist United States’ citizens within the 
context of American society, the ways in which homeland security policy makers seek to 
understand phenomenon, such as suicide terrorism, and the development of strategies 
used to combat terrorism.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
1. Chapter II–Literature Review  
This thesis will begin with a literature review on suicide terrorism. The researcher 
is aware of the need to remain objective and not let the existing perspectives and research 
findings bias the data collection. In order to foster conceptualization of the phenomenon, 
the literature review will be used as an analytic tool. The purpose of the literature review 
will be to provide a rich source of information from which the researcher will be able to 
begin the operations of asking questions and making comparisons of his data. In addition, 
it will give the researcher ideas for theoretical sampling.  
 9
2. Chapter III–Method and Research Design 
This chapter of the thesis will describe in detail the method and design of this 
research project. The researcher utilized the concepts of Social Identity and Intergroup 
Relations theories within a grounded theory research methodology in order to identify 
emerging concepts and ideas.  
3. Chapter IV–Analysis and Findings 
This chapter of the thesis will include an analysis section and a findings section. 
The analysis section will describe in detail the principles of the research. The findings 
section will analyze the last will and testaments of “successful” suicide bombers and 
begin to develop a framework around which homeland security officials can better 
understand the social and cultural conditions necessary for suicide terrorism to exist. 
4. Chapter V–Discussion 
The discussion chapter will identify the implications of the findings of this 
research to homeland security. This chapter will discuss how these social and cultural 
conditions can be interpreted utilizing social identity theory, why it is important, why it is 
necessary for policy makers to understand the social and cultural conditions necessary for 
suicide terrorism to exist, and why developing a better understanding of the phenomenon 
can lead to better homeland security policies. This chapter will also examine some 
prevailing strategies to deter suicide terrorism and make a recommendation for an 
improved framework for analysis and development of policies.  
 10
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Suicide bombing provides a weapon that is uniquely suited to the needs 
and capabilities of terrorist groups, providing them with the best of both 
worlds: the precision and sophistication of the most complex technologies 
as well as relative simplicity and reliability.36 
In October of 1983, a truck loaded with explosives was driven into the lobby of a 
U.S. Marine Corps housing complex in Beirut, Lebanon. The truck detonated, killing 241 
military personnel and injuring 100 others.37 At the time, this suicide-bombing incident 
was the deadliest terrorist attack against a U.S. target in history and signaled the 
beginning of what has since become the deadliest form of terrorism.38 Both secular and 
religious groups have used this tactic with success, and suicide terrorism has become 
more common and geographically diverse.39 There have been over 2,000 suicide 
bombings over the past 25 years and the number of incidents has grown greatly over the 
past decade.40  
It is argued that the United States will not remain immune from the threat of 
suicide terrorism. The potential for these attacks would be diverse. Terrorist groups 
would embrace high-value symbolic targets, such as buildings or installations, high-value 
human targets, such as the President of the United States, and deliberately target the 
public at stadiums, shopping malls, buses, trains, and subways. The research assumes that 
the main suicide threat in the United States will come from radical Islamic jihadists, with 
al Qaeda representing the most serious threat.41 As stated in the recent National Strategy 
                                                 
36  Jeffrey W. Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2012), 346, 255. 
37  Ibid., 47; H. D. Barlow, Dead for Good: Martyrdom and the Rise of the Suicide Bomber Paradigm 
Pub, 2007), 130–131. Ibid., 75. 
38  “CPOST - Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism “ http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php 
(accessed 7/15/2012, 2012). 
39  Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 261. 
40  Philip E. Kapusta, Suicide Bombers in CONUS Command and General Staff College, Advanced 
Military Studies Program, 2007), 30–31. 
41 Bruce Hoffman et al., Preparing for Suicide Terrorism, A Primer for American Law Enforcement 
Agencies and Officers (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,[2004]). Vii–viii. 
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for Counterterrorism, the United States also identifies al Qaeda as its paramount threat. 
The source of the threat has shifted, however, from the core al Qaeda group in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, towards those groups associated, but separate from the main 
group. The strategy recognizes the deliberate efforts of al Qaeda to inspire individuals in 
the United States to conduct terrorist acts of their own.42 U.S. security concerns, 
therefore, require that the social and cultural conditions that allow suicide terrorism to 
occur in other countries be understood in relation to conditions in the United States that 
could encourage radicalized Islamic fundamentalists to conduct suicide terrorism here. 
Understanding the characteristics, strategy, psychology, and social conditions of 
suicide terrorism is an important primer in the analysis of this phenomenon. In a review 
of the literature related to suicide terrorism, one is able to find an abundance of quality 
research that assists the reader in gaining a better understanding of this growing 
phenomenon. There is also, however, as much information that taken alone can mislead a 
reader in their understanding of the phenomenon, and therefore, misguide effective 
policymaking. For example, “single variable explanations,” such as Robert Pape’s 
argument that suicide terrorism is a strategic approach taken by terrorist groups in 
response to foreign occupation, fails to take into consideration the complex history and 
organizational strategy of suicide bombings.43 Based on Pape’s analysis, one could 
reasonably conclude that it would be very unlikely that a suicide terrorism campaign 
could occur in the United States unless a foreign government occupied it. Lewis disagrees 
with the single variable explanation because of the unwarranted assumption that “one 
explanation for suicide bombings can be applied to a broad range of cultures and societies 
with minimal modification.” Lewis argues that the phenomenon is extremely complex 
and cannot be reduced to a “single variable explanation.”44  
Moreover, there is a “fundamental attribution error” towards psychopathology 
when discussing suicide terrorism. After the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush 
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branded the suicide hijackers “evil cowards” and Senator John Warner stated that those 
who perform the act of suicide terrorism are “not rational.”45 Pedahzur argues that 
Western scholars find it hard to understand what compels a person to carry out a suicide 
attack and assume that the cause must stem from some type of mental pathology.46 Lewis 
writes that the “focus on the mindset of the individual bombers has precluded 
understanding of the organizational character of suicide terrorism for many years.”47 
McCauley concludes that research has found little evidence that terrorists suffer from 
psychopathology and sums his argument up nicely, when he writes, “…terrorists emerge 
out of normal psychology of emotional commitment to cause and comrades.” McCauley 
makes the argument that terrorists who operate in groups are very unlikely to suffer from 
serious psychopathology.48  
The present research is directed toward identifying the social and cultural 
conditions that make suicide terrorism a viable form of resistance for terrorist groups and 
the implications these conditions can have on U.S. homeland security. The literature 
review is an analysis of the extensive research that will examine the multi-dimensional 
framework of suicide terrorism, which includes the individual suicide terrorists, the 
terrorist organizations, and the societies in which they operate. 
A. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as “…premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”49 Pape finds that suicide 
terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism because the perpetrator does not expect 
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to survive, and the success of the mission depends on the death of the perpetrator.50 This 
aspect of suicide terrorism is very important because it signals to the group’s enemy and 
the group’s constituency that the mission is of such high importance that the perpetrators 
are willing to give their own lives for the successful execution. This research suggests 
that suicide terrorism can be defined as an act that is intended to influence a large 
audience by the aggressive use of politically motivated violence, during which the 
perpetrator intends or expects to die. 
In addition, research has determined that the targets of the mission are not the 
only victims of the violence.51 The perpetrators also target those that witness the violence 
and are psychologically affected. Pastor, Atran, and Hoffman and McCormick have 
found that the public’s fear of the act of suicide terrorism has a great effect on society.52 
Pedahzur argues that anxiety can spread through society and can reduce the faith that 
citizens have in their government’s ability to protect them. The government in turn faces 
a constrained choice in which they have to appear that they are protecting their citizens.53 
McCauley writes that terrorists want their enemy to “spend time and money on security” 
and to “transfer resources from other productive purposes.”54 Furthermore, Pastor states 
that a general lack of understanding of the act contributes to this effect. Terrorist groups 
count on the media attention gained from this form of terrorism to enhance this fear. 
Pastor also writes that resilience to this form of terrorism can be gained through 
education and insight. He further concludes that those citizens must constantly be  
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reminded that terrorism is a weapon of the weak against the strong. Pastor’s comments 
could be viewed by some to suggest that those who use the tactic of suicide terrorism are 
somehow inferior to those that do not.55  
While these analyses are helpful in defining suicide terrorism, Merari identifies a 
difficulty in finding a definition based on the lack of understanding the mindset of the 
perpetrators. Merari argues that the source of confusion can be attributed to 
understanding whether the perpetrators were seeking to die in the act of terrorism, or if 
they were simply prepared to die to support their cause.56 These types of psychological 
approaches to assess the factors that lead a person to commit an act of suicide terrorism 
leaves many unanswered questions and are not helpful in defining the characteristics of 
suicide terrorism. Moreover, they might preclude a proper discussion of the ways to stop 
suicide terrorism. Pedahzur argues that not a single personality trait common among 
suicides was found to be prevalent among suicide terrorists.57 
Researchers have attempted to identify the goals of suicide terrorism, and it is 
important for the homeland security professional to understand these goals in order for 
them to understand the complex strategic nature of this form of terrorism. Furthermore, 
any analysis of these goals is difficult, because research must take into consideration both 
individual, organizational, and societal goals. Winkates writes that organizational goals 
are accomplished when the group’s reputations are enhanced as a result of its actions. In 
addition, the grievances of the group are then displayed as a result of the media attention 
attained that serves to dramatize their cause, gain popular support, and inspire 
followers.58  
Research conducted by Lewis suggests that terrorist organizations have created 
this model, whereby suicide bombing is a socially sanctioned process that transforms 
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individuals into technological weapons that were needed as an effective means to counter 
military superiority. Lewis writes “effectiveness rather than religious obligation drove the 
use of suicide bombing at the organizational level.”59 
Support conditions to sustain suicide terrorist operations are also necessary. 
Bloom writes that this support can come in several forms: Food, safe houses, recruits, 
financial support for weapons, remuneration of families, and to pay operatives.60 These 
support structures do not develop without challenges. Hoffman and McCormick explain 
that “the process of planning, preparing, and carrying out a terrorist campaign raises a 
group’s operational signature, and therefore, increases the risk of detection.”61 For 
example, Pedahzur and Perlinger found several common features in the study of 
Palestinian suicide networks. First, was that they were large enough to establish an 
infrastructure, but small enough to maintain secrecy. Second, all of the networks had 
hubs that were connected to most of the actors in the group, which suggests the 
importance of collective support for the network. Third, suicide bombers maintained a 
peripheral position in the network and contained a relatively low number of ties to others. 
These Palestinian networks, the researchers found, preferred to dispatch individuals who 
were of minor importance for suicide operations.62 
Hoffman and McCormick offer an understanding of the individual goals by 
explaining that they are attained by the perception of the perpetrators that they will 
receive rewards. These rewards are gained either by way of a religious payoff after death, 
or as is seen in the secular groups, through their accomplishments in furtherance of 
organizational goals.63 A focus, however, on the religious payoffs can lead to the 
assumption, commonly held by Westerners that suicide terrorism is a phenomenon that is 
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conducted by crazed religious fanatics. Narratives that describe the suicide bombers 
receiving seventy-two virgins upon their arrival to heaven can inflame this 
misconception. In contrast, Pedahzur argues that these attacks are almost always 
organizational undertakings, and that the individual is “serving the will of the 
collective.”64 
Pedahzur writes that altruistic suicide terrorism “is the product of situations in 
which a person undergoes a highly compelling process of integration into a social group 
that champions the act of suicide. As a result, the interests and desires of the individual 
become secondary to the group, and he/she will take any step needed to help it advance 
its goals.”65 We can see from the extant research that suicide terrorism can be better 
viewed as an organizational tactic that utilizes rational individuals who are motivated to 
commit their acts due to factors related to social conditions of their environment. But, 
what are the motivations of the individuals who chose to commit these acts, what is the 
strategy of the terrorist organizations, and why does society allow suicide terrorism to 
flourish? 
B. INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATIONS FOR SUICIDE TERRORISM 
The individual psychological factors associated with the choice of participating in 
suicide terrorist activities have been examined with differing results. Merari writes that 
most psychological theories view personality characteristics as one of the “most 
important factors in self-destructive behavior.” He further argues that a comprehensive 
study of suicide bombers is difficult because the people who have actually committed the 
act are unavailable. Merari concludes that the most consistent element seems to be a 
broken family background.66 Laqueur, however, finds that virtually all suicide bombers 
come from large families and have support from their families.67 Given the date of 
Merari’s research, it is expected that the pool of information on suicide terrorism was 
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somewhat limited. More recent research by Pedahzur, Pape, Bloom, and Hoffman, 
however, has found that there is no known profile for the suicide terrorist. They can be 
young or old, college educated or uneducated, male or female, and socially integrated or 
isolated.68 Furthermore, McCauley writes, “that personal frustration associated with 
poverty, poor education, and unemployment is not a useful explanation of terrorism.”69 
Pedahzur argues that “the only partial success in explaining the persistent expansion of 
suicide terrorism by focusing on the isolated suicide bomber, led social scientist to 
redirect the spotlight onto the society and culture that produced these terrorist.”70  
Zimbardo supports this argument by examining terrorism from a situational 
perspective. His basic paradigm illustrates the ease with which otherwise ordinary 
individuals can be induced into “evil” behavior by powerful under-recognized social 
situational variables.71 Zimbardo and McCauley argue that individualistic Western 
societies tend to attribute observed behavior to internal dispositional factors while 
ignoring or minimizing the impact of situational variables.72 As mentioned earlier, this 
can have an impact on how we approach the development of policies to detect and deter 
terrorism. Strategies to prevent suicide terrorism begin with an understanding of the 
organizational motivation process. Zimbardo writes that organizations utilize “a variety 
of social psychological and motivational principles in turning collective hatred and 
general frenzy into a dedicated seriously calculated program of indoctrination and 
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training for individuals to become youthful ‘living martyrs.’”73 It is this refocus of 
attention from the individual history and actions of the suicide terrorist towards the 
cultural and societal factors that enable this phenomenon to grow that will be most 
helpful in developing a full understanding of suicide terrorism and its process of 
radicalization. 
Suicide terrorists are radicalized at some point prior to the execution of their acts 
of terrorism. In his 2008 testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Government Affairs, Professor Fathali Moghaddam warned that violent extremism is 
a growing problem for contemporary societies and will remain a global threat for the next 
few decades. Moghaddam describes his theory of radicalization by comparing the process 
to a staircase. The process begins on the ground floor with the more than 1 billion 
Muslims worldwide experiencing an identity crisis by having to choose between two 
inadequate identities. The first involves copying the “West,” and the second is 
represented by various kinds of Islamic fundamentalists. In a search to improve their 
living conditions, these individuals move up the staircase toward radicalization where 
they come under the influence of persuasive messages that demonize the “West.” Some 
reach higher floors of the staircase by divorcing themselves from morality and justifying 
terrorism. Reaching the highest levels of the staircase means taking part in or directly 
supporting terrorism.74 
Furthermore, law enforcement is now beginning to shift their focus towards this 
process of radicalization. The New York City Police Department studied the ideologies 
that motivate individuals to commit acts of terror, as well as the phases of the 
radicalization process. Their findings identify evidence for distinct phases of 
radicalization and recognize the difficulty in distinguishing the subtle nature of the 
behaviors associated with the process.75 
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Pedahzur writes that individuals seek friendship, before they become dedicated to 
the cause. In some cases, this comradeship seems to be stronger than anything. Pedahzur 
stresses the importance of social bonds with other people who are committed to a 
common cause. This radicalization process sees the group go through a long process of 
peer socialization, strong mutual confidence, and in the end moderate members of the 
groups sometimes adopt the beliefs of the most extreme members. Pedahzu writes: “They 
do not exhibit mental pathologies or personal problems; they are simply strongly 
integrated into the social unit. A successful integration makes the unit and its members 
the most important factor in their lives, and they are willing to do anything for their 
friends and the common cause.”76 The power of group identification, McCauley argues, 
is the foundation of intergroup conflict.77 Pedahzur and McCauley’s research presents a 
contrasting argument to the view of the suicide bomber as a crazed individual with hatred 
towards his enemy. This argument can therefore be reformulated and viewed as 
individuals forming a group in which frustration with an external entity, which 
significantly contributes to action against this entity.  
Terrorists groups use ideology and small-group dynamics to conduct terrorist 
operations. The individual takes on the cause of the group, whether it is based on 
religious beliefs, ethnicity, or nationality. These causes give meaning to life. There is no 
special relationship between suicide terrorism and religion. McCauley supports this 
argument when he writes, “religion is only one kind of cause in which people can find an 
answer to mortality.”78 
Pedahzur argues that once the individual is committed to the group, the 
organizational procedures of devising a suicide operation are performed in a number of 
parallel steps. An important step in the procedure is the recruitment and training of 
potential suicide bombers. The most important phase of the training process is the 
indoctrination of the suicide bombers that includes the prospect of writing a farewell 
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letter or videotaped testament to his or her loved ones. From this point on, there is little 
chance that the bomber will go back on his commitment to the mission because such a 
step would give rise to condemnation from the organization and the community at 
large.79 
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
Suicide terrorist attacks have grown in frequency and lethality since early study of 
the phenomenon began following the suicide attacks in Lebanon in 1983.80 Early study of 
the organizational strategy of suicide terrorism argues that culture and religion were 
relatively unimportant as factors in determining whether a person or group chose to 
participate in suicide terrorist activities. Merari suggests that suicide terrorism was 
conducted by individuals for personal reasons and not in furtherance of any 
organizational goals, and that there was no evidence to support the notion that individuals 
chose to participate in suicide terrorist activities based on the influence of a charismatic 
leader.81 At the time, suicide attacks represented a small fraction of terrorist activity.  
Conversely, more recent research has found that suicide bombings are almost 
always the product of an organizational process, and argue that the identities of people 
who chose to commit acts of suicide terrorism are shaped by a larger social context.82 
Strindberg and Wärn support this concept when they write that the resistance of 
individuals and groups is connected to “complex social networks” and “revolutionary 
ideologies” that exist based on social roles, norms, and cues.83 Research of these complex 
social networks allows the reader to better understand the organizational structures 
underlying suicide attacks. Research by Kruglanski develops a framework within which 
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both personal and social organizational motivational factors can be found in a person’s 
quest for significance. They find that personal traumas encourage a “collectivist switch” 
to justify terrorism, as well as ideological reasons and social pressures.84 Pedahzur writes 
that on the personal level, financial and emotional crises, such as the loss of a loved one, 
are “fair predictors of the willingness to become a suicide bomber.”85 These 
justifications, while accurate in some instances, do not represent a universal rational for 
why some individuals choose to commit acts of suicide terrorism. Pedahzur understands 
this partial understanding and argues that suicide terrorism is a “political phenomenon” 
that is coordinated and organized by a terrorism group, and that personality and 
psychological traits play a secondary role in the development of a suicide bomber.86  
Lewis suggests that one way organizations coordinate these missions is through 
the use of “symbols and rituals to link their operational goals” to martyrdom’s expression 
of self-sacrifice, which can be found in most communities, especially those that feel they 
are threatened by some outside force. This mutual feedback, Lewis argues, gives meaning 
to the individual’s death and the general cause for which it is fighting.87 
Research by Pape also argues that strategically, nonstate terrorist groups choose to 
continue the use of suicide terrorism because it is a successful form of coercion that is 
intended to make governments concede to demands.88 Hoffman and McCormick, 
however, write that suicide terrorism is a constrained choice because the terrorist group 
has neither the support, nor the means to display its message politically.89 If one assumes 
that the terrorist actors are making rational choices, then their display of violence to 
coerce government officials to concede to their demands can be viewed as a strategic 
form of communication. Pedazur argues that on a strategic level most suicide campaigns 
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are meant to bring about political and military changes and will be suspended under 
certain conditions. Such as when the goals of the organization have been attained, if the 
side that is being attacked finds effective ways of stopping the suicide terrorism, or if the 
public the organization seeks to represent makes it clear it does not support the method.90 
Hoffman and McCormick, Pape, and Madsen have evaluated this strategic 
“signaling” and found that, in relation to other forms of tactical operations that are 
available to terrorist groups, it is an effective way for a group to communicate its 
message.91 Kapusta and Hoffman, in seeking to identify why it is effective, offer one 
possible explanation. Suicide operations are inexpensive to execute.92 As an example, 
Hoffman states that a typical Palestinian suicide operation costs one hundred and fifty 
dollars. In addition, Hoffman and McCormick explain that suicide operations cultivate an 
image of strength. These groups are unable to conduct operations on the battlefield and 
need to provide a message to both their target audience, as well as their constituents, 
which display the necessary force to compel.93 For example, Pedahzur writes that Osama 
Bin Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s decision to use large-scale suicide offensives against 
American targets “was meant to signal to the United States that is was dealing with a 
highly determined organization that was not deterred by the necessity of engaging in 
brutal warfare even if it suffered from strategic inferiority,” and finds it difficult to accept 
that his solitary goal was to spread the control of Islam. Pedahzur concludes that Bin 
Laden wanted to “provoke the Americans into an aggressive response against himself, 
and paradoxically also to intensify its military involvement in the Middle East.”94 
Finally, Hoffman and McCormick conclude that suicide terrorism builds solidarity 
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among the group’s base. Critical to the realization of this benefit, however, is the 
collective acceptance of the action.95 
Pedahzur also examined the use of suicide terrorism by the LTTE and Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK-Partiy Karkeren Kurdistan) in order to understand whether there is 
a universal or location-dependent explanation for the use of the tactic. Both groups were 
headed by “charismatic leaders who were responsible for the sect-like features,” and who 
served as the principle source of inspiration for their followers. Pedahzur argues that both 
groups felt “powerless” due to stronger military pressure and dispatched suicide terrorists 
to signal they would not be suppressed. On an organizational level, Pedahzur concludes, 
the LTTE regarded suicide bombings more as a tactic than an organizational strategy. 
The LTTE was able to create a significant base of support for itself and succeeded in the 
use of the tactic, where the PKK was “ideologically remote from large segments of the 
public it sought to represent” and is seen as having failed. The examination of the LTTE 
and the PKK also serve to further identify that the use of the tactic is not unique to 
Islamic fundamentalist groups.96 
Recent research concludes that terrorists groups have increasingly relied on 
suicide terrorism to achieve political objectives. For example, a study by Pape found that 
since 1983 suicide terrorist attacks have occurred worldwide in countries, such as 
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Israel, Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Yemen, and the 
United States.97 Pape and Feldman argue that instead of religion, the strategic goal of 
suicide terrorism is to compel democratic states to withdrawal combat forces. The 
principle cause of suicide terrorism, Pape and Feldman explain, is resistance to foreign 
occupation.98 Hoffman and McCormick supported one aspect of Pape and Feldman’s 
claim when they write that since 1983 only 60 percent of the suicide attacks that have 
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been carried out have been conducted by religious groups.99 Pedahzur, however, finds 
that the military occupation theory does not explain the tendency for Islamic groups to 
use suicide bombings against “pro-western moderate Islamic regimes in order to replace 
them with extreme Islamic ones.”100 
Military occupation alone might not be the most useful explanation for the 
political conditions of suicide terrorism. As Bloom points out, a case like Japan, where 
there has been occupation, opposition to U.S. presence, and a historical precedent of 
suicide attacks, did not resort to the tactic.101 Laqueur writes that the use of suicide 
bombings in opposition to military occupation is “certainly true in some cases, but in 
many cases – from Algeria to Central Asia and the Philippines – it is not.”102 
Furthermore, Lewis argues that some governments that have had success in bringing a 
halt to suicide bombings in recent years have not done so by withdrawing forces, but by 
intensifying their occupations and defeating or killing their adversaries. For example, 
Lewis writes that the twenty-six year struggle of the LTTE, which conducted over a 
hundred suicide bombings, to create a separate homeland in Sri Lanka ended when Sri 
Lankan armed forces killed LTTE’s leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran.103 
Terrorism, however, is a tactic of a militarily inferior opponent against a superior 
one. Hoffman and McCormick find that two considerations shape the choice of suicide 
terrorism as a course of action. The first is a “lack of significant political support in an 
otherwise open political environment,” and the second is the “presence of significant 
popular support in the absence of alternative means of political expression.”104 Atran 
provides further explanation of the conditions necessary to conduct these types of 
operations. A linked group of individuals, who are indoctrinated under charismatic 
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leaders, commit to die for the common good of “alleviating the community’s onerous 
political and social realities.”105 
Pedahzur writes that the most common form of suicide bombing, preferred by the 
majority of organizations that have utilized the tactic, is the detonation of an explosive 
belt directly attached to the militant’s body. This tactic is favored over other methods, 
such as driving a car or truck rigged with explosives and carrying the explosives in some 
type of carry bag. This type of terrorism is very effective. Research by Pedahzur shows 
that while the average number of fatalities from terrorist shooting attacks is 2.11 and 
delaying mechanism attacks is 2.01, the average number of fatalities in a suicide attack 
where the terrorist carries an explosive laden belt is 8.11. That number jumps to 19.08 
when the weapon is an explosive laden car. Furthermore, in most cases the terrorist loses 
no more than one person in these operations. The primary targets of suicide terrorism are 
civilian populations, however, military and police installations have also been targeted.106  
D. SOCIETAL SUPPORT OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
In his early 1990 study, Merari wrote that “all monotheistic religions promise life 
after death” and may thus “encourage suicidal behavior,” especially if it is carried out for 
a “righteous cause.”107 For example, Atran writes that as early as 1988, Palestine Islamic 
Jihad founder Fathi Shiqaqi “established guidelines for “exceptional” martyrdom 
operations involving human bombs.”108 Furthermore, Hoffman and McCormick write 
that the systematic use of suicide terrorism traditionally occurs in environments that place 
an emphasis on communal bonds and have a history of self-sacrifice.109 Bloom explains 
that these cultural factors are critical and that children learn from a very young age to 
understand the glorification of sacrifice in the service of the cause.110 Many cultures, 
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however, that have had historical traditions of self-sacrifice have not seen the 
proliferation of suicide terrorism. Self-sacrifice traditions alone cannot explain the use of 
this tactic. Barlow argues that martyrdom always occurs in the context of perceived 
persecution, exploitation, or oppression. Barlow uses the principles of historical self-
sacrifice to justify the use of suicide terrorism today and attempts to cite examples of 
martyrdom throughout history as precedent for today’s phenomenon.111 Lewis disputes 
this argument by asserting that historical martyrs accepted suffering for themselves 
without inflicting harm on others. Lewis writes that suicide bombing cannot be 
understood by examining individual martyrdom only.112 Barlow’s argument places too 
much emphasis on individual factors related to the choice of suicide terrorism in response 
to persecution and fails to fully consider social and organizational motivations for the use 
of the tactic.  
Hoffman and McCormick argue that there must be an acceptance of suicide 
terrorism by the collective in order to enable this social norm. They find that popular 
acceptance of suicide tactics is an essential prerequisite for a group to advance its 
position of killing its membership, while at the same time continuing to find future 
volunteers.113 Lewis writes,  
For suicide bombing to be effective as a coercive strategy directed against 
an adversary, the bombers must be understood by that adversary as being 
representative of the mindset of their community. If the entire group is 
thought to be willing to fight to the death, the phenomenon becomes 
intimidating; alternatively, if the bombers are seen as being aberrant or 
pathological, the effect is greatly diminished.114 
Pedahzur also arrives at the conclusion that the decision to mobilize suicide 
bombers cannot take place unless there is a social environment that approves of the 
method. Furthermore, the social environment, Pedahzur writes, will significantly 
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facilitate the potential suicide bomber in his enlistment to the mission. This important 
factor can contribute greatly to a person’s feeling of having a positive and distinct 
identity through the participation in suicide terrorism. In addition, the death of a martyr 
must be a collective loss for the organization, as well as the collective and the act of self-
sacrifice needs to balance out the killing of civilians in the eyes of the collective.115  
A collective sense of historical injustice has also been found in groups that 
execute suicide terrorist actions. Atran found that political subservience and social 
humiliation are perceived contexts in which suicide bombers express themselves.116 
These factors can develop into communal bonds necessary for the growth of suicide 
terrorism. Strindberg and Wärn write, “[a] seemingly endless cycle of violence and 
counter-violence taught the mainstream of the Palestinian movement that in order to 
actualize their humanity – to become fully equal to their oppressors – violent action, not 
subservient negotiation, was required of them.” It follows that these collective feelings of 
oppression and the resulting sacrifice can be necessary conditions for suicide terrorism to 
flourish within a community or group.117  
What are the conditions that enable a society to support the phenomenon? 
Pedahzur argues that a survey of areas in the world where suicide terrorism has emerged 
finds a relationship with a long-standing conflict with a powerful enemy that has inflicted 
pain on that society. He argues that certain societies perceive themselves as weak, 
hopeless, and oppressed by this powerful enemy, and that they feel empowered when 
suicide terrorism inflicts pain, confusion, and damage to the aggressor. Innocent citizens, 
including fellow religious or ethnic citizens, are sometimes killed in these operations.118 
Barlow argues that militant Islamic organizations justify this issue by redefining the 
victims as apostates or making the victim part of the unavoidable collateral damage of the 
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cause.119 Pedahzur describes suicide terrorism as a feedback process between an 
organization and its constituency that is necessary for a sustained campaign to survive. 
This cycle can be broken in one of two ways according to Pedahzur, the organizations 
leadership decides that suicide terrorism is no longer effective or the appeal of 
martyrdom diminishes because the community sees a change in external circumstance.120 
E. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY, INTERGROUP RELATIONS, AND THE 
STUDY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
Strindberg writes that “because SIT provides a broad analytical framework for 
understanding groups in general, rather than a content-specific explanation of a single 
group or type of group, it can be used to frame analyses of any given terrorist group, 
across the spectrum of cultures and societies (Emphasis in original).”121 Social identity 
theory and the study of intergroup relations will be useful in examining the phenomenon 
of suicide terrorism because as McCauley writes, “Self sacrifice is not self-evident; it has 
to be constructed in the public eye.”122 
Tajfel offers the following definition of social identity: “Social identity will be 
understood as that part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their 
knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership.” The study of intergroup relations 
examines the roles played by social identity in the ways individuals form groups and 
interact with other groups in a variety of relationships.123 Tajfel, writing on intergroup 
relations, suggests that two components are necessary, and one component is frequently 
associated with them, in order to achieve identification with a group. The two necessary 
components are: A cognitive one or awareness of membership, and an evaluative one, 
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where awareness of membership is given value. The third component is an emotional 
stake in the awareness and evaluations.124  
Moghaddam argues that when examining the path that individuals take towards 
radicalization; the most important feature is how people feel about and interpret their 
personal and collective identities. Moghaddam suggests that it is the perceived feelings 
rather than the actual conditions that are most important.125 The focus on identity begins 
with what Moghaddam describes as an answer to the question, “What sort of person am 
I?” From this question, an individual begins his link with the group. For example, 
answers could be based on religion, ethnicity, or nationality. “I am Muslim,” “I am 
African-American,” or “I am German.”126 Turner argues that individuals structure their 
perceptions of themselves and others by means of these social categories, and the 
processes related to these perceptions produce group behavior. Turner also hypothesizes 
that the possibility exists that social identity may function nearly to the exclusion of 
personal identity. In other words, our self-image might be based solely on our 
membership in groups. Critical to this process is that once individuals define themselves 
as members of a group, there is pressure for them to assume the characterization of the 
group as positive.127 Moghaddam writes this is one of the basic tenants of social identity 
theory, and that any criteria can be used to determine a positive identity.128 Once the 
group is defined as positive, individuals assign the norms of the group to themselves, and 
their category in the membership of the group becomes salient.129 
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There is, however, also a need for distinctiveness between one’s own group in 
comparison to others. Moghaddam offers that individuals determine the positiveness and 
distinctiveness of the groups to which they belong by making intergroup comparisons and 
that each culture guides the individuals with respect to which targets are “correct.”130 
Deschamps writes that “a group has no existence but in relation to other groups.” He 
argues that a group becomes a group by having common characteristics, and that groups 
acquire significance in the perceived differences from other groups.131 McCauley argues 
that groups become radicalized by competition with other groups.132 Lewis supports this 
thinking when he argues that terrorist groups escalate violence in order to create a distinct 
group identity and attempt to outdo or outbid a rival group. For example, in Lebanon, 
Hizballah escalated violence in the form of suicide bombings in order to elevate itself 
above rival group Amal. This concept, however, is not consistent with the LTTE, who 
had already eliminated its main rivals when it began its use of suicide attacks. Lewis 
explains this inconsistency by arguing that the escalation of violence does not cause 
suicide bombing. Groups escalate violence to establish identity and suicide terrorism is 
the ultimate way to establish this distinct identity.133  
Groups can display in-group conflict as well. Lewis cites as an example, the 
LTTE’s ruthlessness in the use of violence against members of its own ethnic 
community. LTTE members who committed violations of the group’s rules were 
executed. Lewis writes that the combination of fear and respect drove the group towards 
an unwavering commitment to its leader Prabhakaran134. McCauley argues that this type 
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of in-group dynamic works the same as out-group competition in developing high 
cohesion within the group.135 
McCauley writes, “The primary source of status in a group in conflict is an 
individual’s contribution toward group success.”136 Turner argues that the need for a 
positive self-image leads to comparisons within the group and a need to differentiate 
from others.137 Suicide terrorism can also provide a way for members of the group to 
distinguish themselves within the group. Moreover, if a group is unable to provide a 
positive identity for its members, they might be inclined to seek membership in another 
group. Strindberg writes that if membership in some other “out-group” with which the 
terrorist group competes is seen as more positive than their own “in-group,” then this 
could lead to defections from the “in-group” and possible disintegration of the group.138 
Groups must consider this in their organizational planning and find strategies to keep 
their “in-group” in tact. One way to accomplish this is seen in the rituals of terrorist 
groups. Lewis argues that martyrdom is a powerful organizational tool that “binds 
members of one belief system and sets them apart from believers in another.” These 
terrorist groups use life and death rituals and symbols to “create group solidarity and 
validate sacrifices that individuals made for the community.” Lewis writes that the deeds 
of the martyrs are observed by the community through programming, such as videotape 
testaments and become part of the public discourse. These rituals and symbols enhance  
the capacity of individuals to take their own lives. Martyrdom serves a strategic purpose, 
asserting a group’s value, establishing group identity, and “providing the moral 
justification for killing others.”139 
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Moghaddam argues that rather than being fixed and innate, this identity need for a 
positive and distinct social identity is malleable and “created by social demands.”140 
Brown and Ross refer to this activity as a “battle of acceptance” and argues that there is a 
dynamic search for positive distinctiveness, which requires recognition from other groups 
in the social order and that without this recognition, “more vigorous attempts at 
differentiation will be expected.”141 McCauley writes that there is usually a sense of 
crisis associated with a threat that is involved in this battle.142 Moghaddam suggests that 
the source of the identity need must come from the “in-group” not the “out-group” and 
that, as an example, Islamic communities are confronted with a threat of imported 
cultural systems and identities that could preclude them from retaining a distinct 
identity.143 
What is important to the present research is the individual’s reaction to this threat 
in this search for a positive and distinct social identity. Cairns in his study on conflict in 
Northern Ireland argues that “a threat to the positive nature of the group’s identity is seen 
as a personal threat,” and that devaluation of the “out-group” is not necessary in this 
reaction.144 This flies in the face of most theories on terrorist conflict. These include 
those previously discussed, such as hatred of the enemy, perceived injustices, and 
material possessions. Individuals can be moved towards violence in response to political 
events that affect their group even though the events might not affect the individual 
directly.145 There are, however, various levels of action that individuals can take in 
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response to a threat to their “in-group.” McCauley argues that the level of action an 
individual chooses is likely a result of the trajectory of their radicalization. Which is, as 
we have shown earlier, not consistent across cultures.146 
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III. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research problem is one that will apply the theory of social identity and 
intergroup relations to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Questions and concepts 
derived from a thorough literature review were used to provide an initial list of 
conceptual areas that will be investigated, and give ideas for theoretical sampling.147 This 
researcher utilized a qualitative research framework for the purpose of discovering the 
prevailing concepts and relationships that can be found in the study of the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism. Furthermore, this thesis used inductive research while utilizing the 
principles of Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Relations Theory in an attempt to 
develop a framework that can be used to better understand the social and cultural 
conditions needed to exist, and could therefore allow suicide terrorism to occur within the 
United States.  
Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg challenge the researcher to utilize an independent 
framework involving “primary sources,” applied in the context of cultural differences 
when studying terrorism.148 A research approach that takes the descriptive details from a 
storyteller, in this case a suicide bomber, who is trying to persuade, convince, express, 
and portray images, can be utilized to satisfy this challenge and act as a basic foundation 
to developing this framework.149 This type of research called for a grounded theory 
approach to investigating this phenomenon.  
A. GROUNDED THEORY  
A grounded theory study, which is derived from data, systematically gathered and 
analyzed through the research process, is likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, 
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and provide a meaningful guide to action.150 The process of developing a grounded 
theory study begins with two basic principles: Asking questions and making 
comparisons. The object is to become sensitive to the properties that might pertain to the 
phenomena of suicide terrorism that otherwise might not be noticed without a proper 
understanding of Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Relations Theory.151 A concept 
that is central to Social Identity Theory is the assumption that the individual is motivated 
to achieve a positive and distinct identity.152 Explicit statements taken from the 
transcripts of “successful” suicide bombers allowed this researcher to develop the 
sensitivity needed to identify these concepts in their statements. A positive and distinct 
identity is not an idea that is fixed inside an individual’s head but should be viewed “as a 
set of collaborative social practices that vary depending on the context.”153 These 
practices can vary from culture to culture and can take many forms. For instance, this 
research identified that one way the Islamic suicide terrorist seeks to achieve a positive 
identity through their acts of suicide terrorism is by attaining an improvement in the eyes 
of Allah.  
It is difficult, however, to determine if the information attained in these transcripts 
actually reflects the thoughts of the suicide terrorist, or if the information serves the 
propaganda purposes of the terrorist organization. It is important to address this 
methodological problem, since it has the chance of biasing the research. Researchers do 
believe, however, that this bias can be marginal.154 This bias would be marginal, if the 
practice of obtaining a positive and distinct identity were viewed as “an individual trying 
to position oneself in relation to others, to achieve a particular presentation of oneself,” or 
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to be like others.155 In other words, the group in which the individuals are positioning 
themselves could determine the criteria for which the individual measures the value of a 
positive and distinct identity.  
The researcher began his data search, by collecting transcripts of video testaments 
or “farewell videos” of suicide bombers. These transcripts were pulled from two main 
sources, the SITE Intelligence Group (SITE) and the World News Connection (WNC) 
websites. The SITE Intelligence Group (SITE) has studied, monitored, and tracked global 
jihadist groups for a decade. The SITE database contains hundreds of video clips from 
suicide bombers. In addition, the World News Connection (WNC) website monitors 
global media and also contains numerous video clips from suicide bombers and their 
families. The collection of data was limited to suicide bombers with a connection to a 
terrorist organization that operated in the Middle East region of the world. It should be 
noted that the collection of data was limited to the Middle East region, due to the 
availability and consistency with which groups in that region made suicide ‘farewell 
videos,’ and the lack of open source videos from other regions, such as Southeast Asia 
and Central Asia. 
The researcher began the process of coding the data by performing open coding, 
axial coding, developing paradigms, and selective coding techniques. The use of memos 
and diagrams helped in the integration of concepts. In order to gain a fuller understanding 
of this phenomenon, concepts relating to a positive and distinct identity were identified 
from these videos, grouped into categories and compared across all categories. The 
analysis continually attempted to identify ideas and new concepts that emerged from the 
data, and classified and compared these to other categories. This framework used the 
techniques of developing paradigms, coding, and integration of concepts. For example, 
the researcher created a paradigm that displayed the properties of a positive and distinct 
identity, and identified codes for each of the properties.  
The researcher used theoretical sampling of the data until reaching a point of 
theoretical saturation. Theoretical sampling means that data sampling evolves during the 
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process, rather than predetermined prior to the research. Theoretical saturation occurs 
when no new data seems to emerge relating to each category of the phenomenon.156 In 
addition, the use of triangulation strategies to counterbalance data sets can be helpful to 
this research. For example, data sources in this research included the literature review, 
statements of suicide bombers, and observations of this phenomenon in the media. For 
example, this research relied on data obtained from the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database 
and the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST). This thesis used 
observations of past events and a content analysis of press and news accounts found in 
the START and CPOST database to provide a method of refining existing theoretical 
concepts.  
In the end, a deeper understanding of this phenomenon emerged and allowed the 
researcher to use these results as a guide to understanding suicide terrorism within the 
context of social identity theory and intergroup relations. Furthermore, a framework was 
developed that could be analyzed and used to better understand the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism and the social conditions necessary for a campaign of suicide terrorism 
to exist in the United States.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. ANALYSIS 
Suicide terrorism is a process that operates simultaneously on three different 
levels, the individual bomber, the society that supports him, and the organizations that 
make use of the tactic.157 (Figure 1.) This process is part of a unique cultural strategy that 
forms as part of a collection of individuals into an integrated entity called an 
organization. Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel describe the Cultural School of strategy 
in their book, Strategy Safari, A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic 
Management. This strategy is rooted in the “social force of culture” and is very 
concerned with the maintaining strategic stability and actively resists change.158  
 
Figure 1.   The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism 
The Culture School associates organizational culture with collective cognition or, 
“the shared beliefs that are reflected in traditions and habit as well as more tangible 
manifestations-stories, symbols, even building and products.”159 These shared beliefs are 
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what suicide terrorist organizations utilize to distinguish themselves from others. It is 
these beliefs that create the foundation on which individuals base their valuation of their 
contribution to the group. A central premise of the Cultural School strategy is that 
individuals acquire beliefs through a process of acculturation, or socialization and is 
reinforced by formal indoctrination.160  
This research will be directed towards two integral parts to this system. The first 
is the link between the suicide terrorist and the society that supports them, and the second 
is the link between the suicide terrorist and the organization that makes use of them. This 
research set out to find if these links could be better understood by utilizing social 
identity theory and intergroup relations theory as a framework for analysis. (Figure 2.) 
 
 
Figure 2.   SIT as a Framework for Analysis 
Social Identity Theory holds that individuals are motivated to achieve a positive 
and distinct identity and that these self-concepts are derived from their participation in 
groups and their knowledge of outside groups. These self-concepts and relationships play 
a very large role in the development, interaction, and actions of suicide terrorists and the 
societies and organizations that support them. Any efforts to better understand the 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism and possibly develop strategies to preclude suicide 
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terrorism from occurring should have knowledge of the unique cultural process and 
concept of achieving a positive and distinct identity. The study of suicide terrorism must 
look outside its traditional concepts of analysis and try and identify alternative methods 
that take into consideration these types of collective processes. 
Finding these concepts in the statements of suicide terrorist farewell testaments 
was the goal of this research. The researcher developed a paradigm or model on which to 
base the analysis of the statements of the suicide bombers. (Table 1.) This paradigm was 
developed to identify a basic concept of Social Identity Theory, an individual’s 
knowledge that he belongs to a group, and that there is a value significance placed on that 
membership.161 There is a strong motivation on the part of the individual to assume that 
the value placed on their membership to the group is positive in nature and might even 
reinterpret as positive those characteristics seen as negative by outside groups.162 There is 
also a need for this value to assume distinctiveness from other groups. In-groups compete 
against out-groups not because there is any realistic conflict, but to differentiate them and 
maintain a positive identity.163  
 
 
Table 1.   Model to Code Positive and Distinct Indicators 
For instance, Islamic communities are experiencing an identity crisis. This 
identity crisis has the following features: Crisis taking place in the middle of political, 
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economic and cultural changes. Muslim youths are searching for direction for a better 
tomorrow. Importation of western ideals has led many youth in Islamic societies to be 
attracted to western ideals. This leads many to fill an identity void by moving towards 
Islamic fundamentalism.164 This research therefore examined statements made from 
Middle Eastern Islamic suicide terrorists and utilized a paradigm created to identify 
characteristics that would indicate in their statements, the desire to attain a positive and 
distinct identity.  
B. FINDINGS 
Abu-Huzaifah al-Yamani, a suicide bomber who used a car bomb to destroy a 
bridge in Badush, Iraq on May 16, 2007, 165 stated in his last will and testament, 
And the prophet of God, peace and God’s prayers be on him, said: ‘If I 
intend to invade for the sake of God and I get killed, then I invade and get 
killed, then I invade.’ So, my dear nation, this is great proof to die as a 
martyr for the sake of god, so stand up to protect your religion and defend 
your honor, as I have decide to make this bridge ruins for the sake of God, 
for you [nation], and for your honor,” and “As Ali, may god be pleased 
with him, said: ‘A group is better than one.’ And to the amir of the 
believers, I love you more than I love life, and to my people and 
particularly my mother, my ever lasting love, I bid you farewell and do not 
be afraid and think of me being with god as we will meet in paradise, God 
willing.166 
Al-Yamani expresses affirmation of his belief in the good of dying for the sake of 
god, collective action, and his defense of the honor of his nation. He is also optimistic in 
his life after death. 
In April, 2007, two suicide truck bombs killed nine U.S. soldiers and wounded 20 
in Diyala Province, Iraq.167 The suspected perpetrators Abu Hafs al-Ansari and Abu 
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Othman al-Ansari urge other Muslims to follow their example. Hafs al-Ansari stated in 
his last will and testament,  
The Qur’an tells us to follow Allah and the instructions of His Prophet, 
and do not argue so you do not fail and your efforts go to waste with the 
wind, and be patient because Allah is with the patient people. Brothers in 
Islam, you must resist…..resistance, resistance…..and bonding, bonding. 
Victory is imminent with the permission of Allah.168 
Othman al-Ansari stated in his last will and testament, 
Brothers in Islam, I undertake this blessed suicidal operation. Nothing 
really is bothering me in this world, but I am just anxious to serve my god 
and support Him. How can we enjoy living when Islam was insulted and 
honors were violated, women were raped, and men and children were 
killed, and the prisons of the infidels were filled with the people of Tawhid 
and the swords of the apostates are placed on the necks of the 
worshipers…after all that how can we enjoy living? Our course is jihad 
and martyrdom, and our souls are cheap for the Cause of Allah. Glory is to 
Allah and to the Muslims.169 
Hafs al-Ansari expresses affirmation and confidence in his belief that his efforts 
will not go to waste. He derives a positive identification from this confidence. He also 
believes that victory is imminent and that his efforts of resisting and bonding with his in-
group will be the key to gaining victory. Othman al-Ansari’s statement shows optimism 
that he is fighting for the honor of those that are violated, including women and children. 
This gives Othman al-Ansari a positive cause for which he is correcting a perceived 
wrong. He affirms his belief in martyrdom and states he is willing to sacrifice his soul for 
the cause of Allah. 
 
Abu Khattab al-Ansari, Abu Azzam al-Muhajir, and Abu al-Walid al-Shami make 
statements in a video that purports to claim responsibility for a dual bombing in August, 
2006 in Mosul, Al-Ramadi, Iraq. Khattab al-Ansari states in his last will and testament,  
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He who is in Iraq knows very well that victory is imminent and the 
liberation of this land will soon happen. Allah had promised and Allah 
keeps His promise. Here is America stumbling before the strikes of the 
Mujahideen. 
The other ‘Hezbollah’ that supported the Americans and the Shi’ites and 
participated in the establishment of this collaborator government in the 
call for the formation the idolater guards, the apostate police…we say to it 
that the real fire has not reached you yet, but there is a day awaiting for 
you very soon…. 
And we send a message to the sheikhs of the tribes and we say: the 
defense of the land and the honor is a legal duty imposed on every 
Muslim; no one is allowed to linger in the fulfillment of this duty instead 
of helping the enemy such as the joining of the Islamic party and similar 
issues, like those who accepted shoes worn by those infidels.170 
Khattab al-Ansari confirms his optimism and confidence that victory is near and 
distinguishes his in-group from the American out-group. In addition, he places a value on 
the distinctiveness between his group and a competitor ‘Shi’ite’ group. His cause is in 
support of the ‘defense of the land,’ and it is an ‘honor’ that is the ‘legal duty’ of every 
Muslim. This duty gives him positive feeling of self-worth and authenticity in his actions. 
Azzam al-Muhajir states in his last will and testament, 
A message, a message to all those who thought that the suicidal people 
have killed themselves running away from the reality of the world. Really 
they went to a new life with the permission of the One and Only; a life of 
what was never seen or swayed the mind of any human. Let it be 
understood to all the scholars in the Arabian Peninsula and in all the Arab 
countries that we are coming just like what that brother had said. We are 
coming with the suicidal operations, with the fighter, the ones who are 
going on foot, and with the suicidal people, and with the permission of 
Allah, the call for prayer will be held from Washington to Russia.171 
You saw the women getting raped but the manhood is for those who say, 
here I am in Baghdad, here I am in Fallujah, here I am in Afghanistan, 
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here I am in Chechnya. But I swear if you do not get up, Allah will bring 
other to support His religion.172 
Al Muhajir comments on common perceptions about suicide bombers. His 
comments suggest that he is seeking a better life, not running from his old life. Moreover, 
his comments suggest that he is seeking to improve his manhood by taking action in 
defense of women. Al-Walid al-Shami states in his last will and testament, 
I send a message to those who are working for the support of the religion: 
fear Allah and peruse His course, you are on the road of glory and dignity. 
It is the road to win paradise and to gain the acceptance of Allah. May 
Allah protect you and your leaders everywhere. In the Name of Allah, the 
best jihad for the Sake of Allah is the suicidal operation. The breaking of 
the enemy is to be done by the suicidal operations; it is the easiest way to 
paradise.173 
Al-Walid al-Shami’s comments identify an understanding that his actions will 
lead to a positive improvement in his life. He believes that he will gain ‘glory and 
dignity’, ‘win paradise’, and ‘gain the acceptance of Allah’. He is confident that suicide 
operations are the best way to distinguish victory over the out-group. 
On September 15, 2006, two suicide bombing attacks by vehicle occurred against 
oil refineries in Dubba Port and Mareb, Yemen.174 Four suicide bombers were 
involved.175 In a video, which claimed responsibility for the attack, the suicide bombers 
were identified as Shafik Ahmed Omar Zayd, Hashim Khalid al-Iraqi, Omar Bin Sayd 
Gar Allah, and Ahmend Muhammadal-Abiyad.176 Omar Zayd states in his last will and 
testament, he is “wishing to free the servants [of Allah] from servitude which is not 
servitude towards the Lord of His servants.” “Even if they have planes, Allah is above 
them.” “We are the ones assisting in the killing of Muslims. We are the ones who 
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appointed these apostate rulers…and obeyed them blindly.” “Who else will help us, 
rulers serving as agents?” “Well, you’re either with the cross or with the Mujahideen.”177 
Omar Zayd’s statement displays his confidence in his work to free people from 
‘servitude.’ He distinguishes those out-groups that are hurting the cause from those that 
are helping the cause. Khalid al-Iraqi states in his last will and testament that the ruling 
class is “forsaking the Sunnah in their parliaments…” Syd Gar Allah states in his last will 
and testament, that local governments are agents of the Americans “and its so-called War 
on Terror.” Muhammadal-Abiyad states in his last will and testament, “Are you not 
Arabs? Are you not the desendants of the heroes?” “The day before yesterday it was 
Palesitne and Afghanistan, yesterday it was Iraq, today it is Lebanon and tomorrow – 
Syria?”178 Each of these statements identifies an opportunity for the in-group to 
distinguish itself from the out-group. Each individual tries to also distinguish the positive 
actions of the in-group versus the negative actions of the out-group.  
The Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for a May 2007 suicide car 
bombing that killed 12 Iraqi police officers in Samarra, Iraq.179 A video claiming 
responsibility for the attack identified Abu Jafar al-Yemeni as the attacker.180 Al-Yemeni 
states in his last will and testament, “He is doing this operation for the Cause of Allah.”  
In another video claiming responsibility for a car bombing on Kurdish forces in Mosul, 
Iraq, Abu al-Bara’a al-Shami states in his last will and testament, “For the victory of the 
religion of Allah, I will carry out this operation which Allah has decided that should be 
completely for His satisfaction. Victory will be for Allah, if He so wishes.”181 Al-
Yemeni’s and al-Shami’s comments affirm their belief that they are taking this action for 
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a higher cause and shows optimism that they will receive a positive gain from their 
actions. 
Abu Usama Al-Madani, a suicide bomber who carried out an operation against a 
police post in Tikrit, Iraq, states in his last will and testament,  
I say to my mujahidin brothers from other groups: unite in this Islamic 
country that was established in the Land of Two Rivers. Do not let it down 
after all these sacrifices and do not let your enemies celebrate. Unite your 
ranks as God has ordered us and stay on the right path. I say to you, 
heaven is where we will meet. Peace. Glory be to God, his prophet, and 
the faithful but hypocrites do not know.182 
Al Madani identifies a need to unite groups together in conflict with a common 
out-group. He shows optimism that his in-group is ‘on the right path’. Moreover, he 
shows positive affirmation in his belief that he will gain acceptance into heaven.  
This research was able to find numerous expressions of affirmation from the 
suicide bombers that their actions were in some way taken for a cause larger than 
themselves. In addition, the suicide bombers showed optimism and confidence that their 
chosen path would lead to a greater place for themselves in the afterlife. All these 
concepts were found within the context of the suicide bomber gaining or improving from 
their actions. Moreover, calls for group action were found in the statements. The suicide 
bombers pleaded with the members of their in-group to unite and bond for the cause. In 
addition, the suicide bombers detailed the distinctiveness between the in-group and the  
out-groups. This research was able to identify characteristics in the statements of the 
suicide bombers that indicate that they desire to attain a positive and distinct identity 
from their participation in suicide terrorism missions. 
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V. DISCUSSION  
Knowing the other and knowing oneself, 
In one hundred battles no danger. 
Not knowing the other and knowing oneself, 
One victory for one loss. 
Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself, 
In every battle certain defeat.183 
 
Traditional discussions of suicide terrorism attempt to search for causes and 
effects of the phenomenon on society. This cause and effect model facilitates law 
enforcement and military methods of counterterrorism that focus on the response and/or 
prevention aspects of terrorism. Moreover, there is a concern with the adversarial 
relationship between the researcher and the terrorism research subjects and the 
interdependent relationship between the research of terrorism and the counterterrorism 
community.184 The research of terrorism, and specifically for this research the study of 
suicide terrorism, needs to develop a better understanding of the phenomenon uncovered 
though sociological models. This effort is in the greater interest to more effectively 
defend against terror attacks, not to defend terrorists or terrorism as somehow right or 
justified.185  
An “alternative normative account” will understand individual choices not caused 
by external forces, but as a choice that is regulated by norms and rules of the normative 
system a person feels is “appropriate in cultural context.”186 Individuals do have free will 
to choose paths of action, however, in some instances the situational factors make one 
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path more likely.187 For example, in the United States, if you want to be involved in a 
group, there are ample opportunities to participate with an athletic team. You can join the 
football, baseball, or tennis team in High School or find another local team and 
participate. These options are not universally available across the United States, but in a 
large part of the country, present a very powerful way for individuals to create a positive 
and distinct identity for themselves. Sports and athletics are a very large part of the 
culture in the United States. There are also, however, an abundance of alternative group 
options that take the form of gangs or other criminal enterprises that can be attractive to 
individuals.  
Moghaddam argues that in any given context, an individual has several 
“normative systems within which to think and act incorrectly or correctly.” Moreover, he 
concludes that Social Identity Theory is compatible with a cultural perspective of the 
discussion of individuals and their choice of actions, and that predictability in behavior 
arises because most of the time people behave according to the dominant normative 
system in their culture.188 In mono-group societies, individuals follow the norms of one 
or two groups in society. Multi-group societies are founded on a diverse group of 
lifestyles.189 This has important implications for how individuals express themselves and 
view their personal freedoms. In multi-group societies, such as those found in the United 
States, individuals have many more opportunities to achieve a positive and distinct 
identity within their group interaction than in other mono-group societies. This is a 
perceived advantage to the United States in the development of groups or individuals that 
might choose suicide terrorism as a course of action. The perception of the United States 
as a multi-group society can be a limiting factor in the development of suicide terrorists; 
however, it might have other identity weaknesses. 
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A. THE AMERICAN DREAM 
American identity is a very powerful concept. Even in the worst parts of the 
country, you will find a strong national pride. America draws millions to its borders 
because it offers the “Land of opportunity” and a place where “anybody can make it.” 
The “power of the American dream” can drive society and contribute to the success of 
the economy; however, this does not mean that all of the assumptions that form the 
foundation of this dream are correct.190 Moghaddam argues that this “American Dream” 
assumes that there is an exceptionally high level of social mobility in the United States, 
but that income disparity between the rich and the poor in the United States disputes this 
assumption. This can be an example of a dominant culture concept that influences 
individual perceptions.191 Individuals become frustrated with their situations and turn to 
alternative means to achieve their positive and distinct identity. 
Most important in this discussion is the choice of resistance within a society. 
Individuals who choose resistance are linked to the “complex social networks they 
encounter.”192 Ideologies that spur resistance are formed from these network's “social 
roles, norms and cues.”193 Some individual characteristics can play a role in suicide 
terrorism. As noted earlier in this research, there is no known profile of a suicide terrorist. 
An important trend, however, is the use of unmarried males from late teenage to early 
twenties. Suicide terrorism can be viewed as a form of “rebellious risk-taking behavior” 
that can be seen in young single males in the United States and other Western 
societies.194 Can this behavior play a factor in the achievement of identity in the United 
States? 
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B. CULTURE OF HONOR 
The attraction of young males to risk-taking behavior can move individuals to 
radical action and resistance.195 Two important points need to be discussed in this context 
of individual’s interactions with their society and the resultant behavior. The 
disenfranchised, marginalized, young, and restless are more likely to engage in violence 
and risk taking for thrill and status.196 Violence is much more prevalent among young 
men, including those in the United States. 
In his 2008 book, Outliers, Malcolm Gladwell analyzes individual success stories 
or people he calls “Outliers.” He examines patterns behind certain everyday phenomena 
that affect the lives of these “Outliers” and makes them successful. He utilizes a 
framework that discounts “individual personal choices and actions in isolation” and 
attempts to understand how culture, family, and friends make a difference in people’s 
lives and actions.197 
The culture of honor phenomenon attempts to look at violence from a broader 
perspective and discounts an individual’s personal choices or actions. Gladwell frames 
his interpretation of the culture of honor by describing the violent feuds between families 
in late nineteenth century Kentucky. The culture of honor hypothesis states that, one is 
willing to fight in response to a challenge to ones reputation. This is because a man’s 
reputation is at the center of his self-worth.198 Gladwell relates that this culture of honor 
is a learned process that is passed down through generations. He explains that it is present 
in Kentucky and most of the southern United States, due to the earliest settlers of that 
region being from marginally fertile highland areas, such as Scotland. Herdsmen, who 
tended sheep and raised goats, typically inhabited these areas. Herdsmen typically have 
more difficulty completing their work and have to be aggressive. People who were from  
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lawless areas also inhabited this area. They were clannish and responded by forming tight 
family bonds. All these factors contributed to the culture of honor phenomenon in the 
U.S. South.199 
Further evidence of Gladwell’s culture of honor framework is found in additional 
research studies. A research study conducted by Cohen and Nisbett also argued that the 
U.S. South possesses a version of the culture of honor. A man who is insulted by another 
and does not retaliate risks having his reputation tarnished. Their conclusion found that 
this culture of honor is responsible for a good deal of violence in the South.200 In 
addition, a research study by Brown, Osterman and Barnes, argued that high schools in 
culture of honor states had twice as many school shootings per capita as nonculture of 
honor states. They also concluded that many acts of school violence result from 
retaliatory aggression in response to social identity threats.201 Finally, two studies by 
Barnes, Brown and Tamborski examined the hypothesis that risk taking, which provides 
social proof of strength, would be higher in culture of honor states and that risk taking 
would result in higher accidental deaths. This research concluded that culture of honor 
states exhibited higher rates of accidental death among whites.202 
Evidence of a culture of honor is also present in other areas of the world that has 
seen instances of suicide terrorism. In Nancy Dupree’s research on “Cultural heritage and 
national identity in Afghanistan,” she writes that honor is very important in the Afghan 
culture and family is an important institution in Afghan society.203  Afghanistan was 
invaded by the Soviet Union in December of 1979. Essential to Afghan life during this 
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period was the ability to uphold family honor while maintaining a good reputation with 
the foreigners who surrounded them.204 Following this event, the Afghan people suffered 
at the hands of the Taliban, who attempted to diminish the social identity of the 
country.205 Over a period of about thirty years, the Afghan people endured the traumas of 
war, inept governments, and an enormous disruption to their cultural identity.206 These 
cultural conditions could contribute to a diminished feeling of self-worth. 
This research has created a framework to better understand why individuals 
choose suicide terrorism as a course of action. One aspect of this framework is to 
determine if the culture of honor phenomenon exists within the framework of social 
identity and intergroup relations theory and could therefore assist in the development of 
those who choose to participate in terrorist activities in the United States.  
Knowledge of how the culture of honor could play a role in terrorism would help 
homeland security officials identify at-risk individuals and address issues that influence 
them. In addition, an understanding of culture of honor and social identity could help 
local law enforcement be effective at changing social thinking and assist those who are 
at-risk to better understand alternatives to violence. The culture of honor phenomenon 
can be an important primer in the study of suicide terrorism and can be included in the 
framework that is developed by this research to better understand this complex social 
phenomenon.  
C. THE SPREAD OF INNOVATION 
Could there be factors that preclude suicide terrorism from being a course of 
action chosen by the risk-taking young males and flourishing in countries such as United 
States? An analysis of United States homegrown violent jihadist activity suggests that the 
group has “little stomach for suicide operations” and “lack an understanding of bomb 
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making.”207 For suicide terrorism to take off in a new context, numerous factors must fall 
into place simultaneously. United States homeland security community must recognize 
“the multiple ways that the failure of suicide bombing can be encouraged as well as 
prudence in action so to not inadvertently facilitate its acceptance.”208  
In the spread of innovations, utility is an important factor in determining whether 
a technology is transferred from one society or culture to the next. Likewise, suicide 
bombing does not automatically flow from one society to the next without a local 
modification that will adapt the technology to the norms and constrains of the new 
society.209 Lewis argues that compatibility is the extent to which a technology is 
consistent with a particular set of cultural or social norms. Is this tactic compatible with a 
group’s perceived needs? Is the tactic a better solution for individuals seeking a way to 
create a positive and distinct identity?210 When society does not support the strategy or 
the individual is not motivated or sees an alternative means to get what he or she desires, 
the compatibility of suicide terrorism with a group's strategy might not be present. The 
strategies for precluding this technology from taking hold in the United States must be 
consistent with an understanding of the dynamics of the role individuals have in society. 
D. STRATEGIES TO PREVENT SUICIDE TERRORISM 
It is important to distinguish between the different responses and strategies to 
deter suicide terrorism. Pedahzur created a model in which short-term responses whose 
aim is to protect the population from suicide attacks in the middle of a campaign is 
contrasted with long-term responses that are meant to address the root causes of 
terrorism.211 Short-term responses are those small-scale operations aimed at the terrorist 
organizations to prevent an attack that is already underway, or defensive strategies whose 
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goal is to minimize consequences of an attack. Long-term responses hope to reduce an 
organizations interest in initiating attack by eradicating the terrorist group's infrastructure 
or undertaking efforts to meet the demands of the group and reduce support for violent 
activities.212 While these methods of deterrence are necessary in certain instances, they 
concentrate on individual parts of the dynamic cycle that allows suicide terrorism to 
occur (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.   Traditional Suicide Terrorism Deterrence Strategies 
Research by Davis and Jenkins, however, seeks to expand and broaden the 
concept of deterrence to encompass “influence operations,” and might offer a better 
opportunity for researchers and counterterrorism officials to develop strategies based on 
the framework developed in this research. These efforts of influence range from co-
optation to deterring terrorists by destroying or “crushing” them.213 In an expanded 
study, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism 
(START) organized the comprehensive theoretical knowledge applicable to Davis and 
Jenkins concept of influencing violent extremist organizations and assessed the support 
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for their assertions.214 Of the many interesting assessments in the study, one in particular 
is most relevant to this discussion. The study concludes with high confidence that 
“Groups and individuals prefer to have an optimal level of uniqueness and 
distinctiveness; a group that is similar will threaten the group’s distinctiveness which may 
prompt intergroup issues.” This distinctiveness threat is a type of threat related to Social 
Identity Theory and the START research concludes that there are multiple quantitative 
analyses supporting this hypothesis. Furthermore, the study stated that the empirical 
results would hold true in the context of influencing violent extremist organizations.215  
The implications of this research should support the idea of developing strategies 
to combat the proliferation of suicide terrorism, by fully understanding the effect of 
Social Identity and Intergroup Relations Theories on individual and group conduct. This 
can best be accomplished by viewing suicide terrorism as a complex system, and 
concentrating efforts to preclude suicide terrorism from flourishing in the United States 
by developing strategies that direct efforts at the connections of the elements. (Figure 4.) 
 
 
Figure 4.   Interactive Elements of Suicide Terrorism  
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E. VIEWING SUICIDE TERRORISM THROUGH A COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
LENS 
Davis and Jenkins agree with this complex systems framework analysis because, 
“The terrorist problem occurs in a rich context with many interacting entities and 
processes. Some aspects of the system are hierarchical; others are distributed; still others 
are networked. Terrorist systems adapt over time.”216 Adding to the complex nature of 
this analysis is that each of these different terrorist groups is competing with each other 
and might possess motivations that are not consistent across the board. Davis and Jenkins 
suggest that a systems approach means breaking down the system into parts and 
identifying the areas in which terrorist groups might be deterred or influenced.217 
Meadows also agrees with this complex system analysis,  
On the one hand, we have been taught to analyze, to use our rational 
ability, to trace direct paths from cause to effect, to look at things in small 
and understandable pieces, to solve problems by acting on or controlling 
the world around us…. On the other hand, long before we were educated 
in rational analysis, we all dealt with complex systems. We are complex 
systems—our own bodies are magnificent examples of integrated, 
interconnected, self-maintaining complexity. Every person we encounter, 
every organization, every animal, garden, tree, and forest is a complex 
system.218   
System problems, those that persist in spite of great analytical ability and 
technical ingenuity, are undesirable characteristics of the systems that produce them and 
will only be deterred by developing an understanding of the systems and a strategy to 
approach it.219 Attempts to deter the proliferation of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism 
have seen both success and failure. Long- and short-term offensive and defensive  
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measures, such as those suggested by Pedahzur, can and should still be considered, but 
can be supplemented with a framework of understanding that views suicide terrorism as a 
complex adaptive system.  
Meadows asks the researcher some questions in order to determine if what is 
being observed is a system:  
Can you identify parts? … Yes, research has identified that the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism is comprised of three parts, the individuals who blow themselves up, the 
organizations that direct the bomber, and the societies that provide support.  
Do the parts affect each other? … Yes, research has identified, through the 
application of Social Identity and Intergroup Relations Theory to suicide terrorism, that 
individual and group behavior are affected by the value and emotional significance that is 
put into participation of the group.  
Do the parts together produce an effect that is different from the effect of each 
part on its own? … Yes, it is the interactive nature of the parts that produces the 
phenomenon.  
Does the effect, the behavior over time, persist in a variety of circumstances?... 
Yes, research has identified that the phenomenon of suicide terrorism has persisted over 
time and cultures.220 The phenomenon of suicide terrorism is a complex systems 
problem.  
Complex adaptive systems will continue to function even with complete changes 
to the elements, as long as the interactions among the elements remain the same. If the 
interactions of the elements change, however, the system can be greatly altered.221 
Reductionist thinking on the subject of suicide terrorism has lead to the belief that if the 
elements of the phenomenon, the individuals, organizations, and societies that support 
suicide terrorist operations, can be identified and eliminated, that suicide terrorism will be 
decreased. Systems thinking, on the other hand, will approach the proliferation of suicide 
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terrorism by identifying the interactions among the elements, understanding the dynamics 
of the interactions, and developing strategies to redirect these interactions to other 
elements.  
As an example, a system diagram of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism will 
assist in identifying a framework, developed through the application of social identity and 
intergroup relation theories to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, which could be used 
by U.S. homeland security officials to better understand the threat of suicide terrorism. A 
system’s stock is the element or foundation of the system.222 In the case of suicide 
terrorism, the stock would be the instances of suicide-bombing attacks. A feedback loop 
is formed when changes to the stock affect the inflow or outflow of the stock. Balancing 
feedback loops are equilibrating in a system and can be sources of stability or resistance. 
Reinforcing feedback loops are found whenever a system element is able to reproduce 
itself.223 Balancing feedback loops constrain growth and reinforcing feedback loops feed 
growth. The inflow of potential suicide bombers is controlled by a perceived identity 
crisis and the presence of strong organizational ideology. The reinforcing growth of 
suicide terrorist attacks is the result of intergroup competition, the perceived gains in 
emotional value of identity attained from the attacks, and society’s reinforcement of that 
emotional value. The balancing function of the system is the continuous death of the 
perpetrators (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.   Suicide Terrorism viewed as a Complex System 
In the diagram above, the clouds represent the boundary of the system for this 
discussion. There are no real boundaries for systems, however, because all systems are 
connected to other systems.224 Suicide terrorism is a complex system within a complex 
system of terrorism. U.S. homeland security could use this systems framework for 
developing strategy to preclude a campaign of suicide terrorism from occurring on 
American soil. 
F. CONCLUSION - BLACK SWAN EVENTS 
A campaign of suicide bombings in the United States lies outside of expectations. 
It would have an extreme impact on feelings of security, economy, resilience, and 
expectation of homeland security. It would cause a search for explanations after the fact, 
making it predictable and explainable. A sequence that is very similar to the events of 
September 11, 2001. Taleb defines these types of hard to predict, low probability-high 
consequence, retrospectively predictable events, as ‘black swan’ events.225  
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Taleb argues that human beings suffer from what is called the triplet of opacity. 
The illusion of understanding, thinking we know what is going on in a world that is more 
complicated than we realize; the retrospective distortion, assessing matters only after the 
fact, as if they were in a rearview mirror; and over valuating factual information and the 
handicap of authoritative and learned people, particularly when they create categories.226 
Traditional methods of studying suicide terrorism have attempted to draw linear causality 
conclusions to a complex growing phenomenon. Deterrence strategies have centered on 
the elements of the system instead of the interactive nature of the system itself. Experts in 
the field have developed convenient ‘categories’ in which to place the prevailing 
understandings of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism cannot be a ‘Black Swan’ event in 
the United States.  
Through the identification of alternative normative accounts in the choices that 
individuals make, this research is able to identify the complex social conditions of suicide 
terrorism. The phenomenon is driven by powerful socio-cultural systems that prey on an 
individual’s basic identity needs. The United States possesses many qualities that can 
balance this complex identity need in an individual, but there are factors that could 
change this dynamic, such as the identification of the culture of honor phenomenon in the 
United States. Suicide terrorism is an innovation that can be adopted within the correct 
social and cultural context. Homegrown radicalized citizens have not adopted this 
innovation within the United States yet, but a framework is necessary for homeland 
security officials to understand this complex system. 
This research has developed the framework for understanding the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism that can be used by homeland security officials to create policy to assist 
in preventing individuals from becoming radicalized toward violent extremism. This 
research did not provide an absolute solution to the proliferation of suicide terrorism, but 
helps to provide an understanding of the social positioning of citizens of the United States 
and the implications of social identity and intergroup relations theory on the proliferation 
of suicide terrorism.  
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